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How do different degrees of displaced people’s hardship shape their expectations of peace 
and violence in post-conflict societies? We develop a novel explanation and empirically 
examine it using survey data collected in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2013. The displaced may 
suffer by being the target of the hostility of opposing groups and/or by receiving little 
support from, or being mistreated by, their own groups and international actors. As a 
result, they develop negative opinions about these actors, friend and foe alike, become 
pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation, and see post-conflict peace 
unsustainable. We find those who have suffered greater hardship during displacement are 
more likely to foresee political violence. Hardship during displacement is also a stronger 
predictor than the experience of violence. Our analysis implies that, while violence does 
have an impact as suggested by the literature, other hardship during displacement, such 
as the lack of support, also matters. 
 
Keywords: displaced persons, victimization, refugees, peacebuilding, Bosnia 
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Forced displacement is rife, with over 65 million people affected in 2018 alone (UNHCR 
2019).1 Yet post-displacement trajectories can vary significantly for a variety of reasons. 
Some people’s lives are completely derailed when they are forced into refugee camps 
(e.g., Palestinians and Syrians in the broader Middle East). Meanwhile, others bounce 
back by integrating into a new environment (e.g., in the EU or North America). 
 The emerging literature finds different war-related experiences, the experience of 
violence in particular, lead to different expectations of peace (Hazlett 2017; Hirsch-
Hoefler et al. 2016; Tellez 2018). Given this, we ask the following question: How do 
different degrees of displaced people’s hardship shape their expectations of peace and 
violence in post-conflict societies? 
Conflict recurrence is a popular area of quantitative research in political science 
(e.g., Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Sambanis 2000). 
The literature has traditionally examined it using macro-level, observational data. 
However, more recent scholarship has begun to conduct micro-level, survey/experiment-
based studies, taking a different approach to conflict recurrence by looking at individual 
attitudes to post-conflict peace process (e.g., Hartman and Morse 2018; Hazlett 2017; 
Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2016; Tellez 2018). Although displacement is common, to the best 
of our knowledge no study has systematically examined the effect of different 
displacement experiences on expectations of future peace and violence in a post-conflict 
society. The increasing rate of displacement, both internal and cross-border, caused by 
violent conflicts around the world, calls for studies disaggregating displacement 
experiences and examining their effects on individual attitudes. In our context, if greater 
 
1 The figure includes asylum-seekers, IDPs (including those in IDP-like situations), and refugees 
(including those in refugee-like situations). 
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hardship experienced by the displaced indeed increases their expectation of political 
violence in a post-conflict society, supporting the displaced to avoid hardship has 
implications for building sustainable peace. It would give fewer opportunities for 
hardliners to use the fear of political violence among people for ethno-political 
mobilization and undermine a peace process. 
To answer our question, we develop a novel explanation, hypothesizing that if 
people experience greater hardship during displacenent, they are more likely to foresee 
political violence in a post-conflict environment. People can suffer hardship while in 
displacement, by being the target of the hostility of opposing groups and/or by receiving 
little support from, or being mistreated by, members of their own group and/or 
international actors. Through such hardship, they develop negative opinions about these 
actors and apply them to their expectations of the post-conflict process. Put otherwise, if 
people form expectations based on their negative experience of an opposing group, their 
own group, and/or the international community, they are more likely to become 
pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation and, therefore, more likely to expect post-
conflict peace to be unsustainable and political violence to come back, than those who 
have not amassed negative information because they have experienced less hardship 
during displacement. 
We test our hypothesis using our original nationally representative survey data 
collected in 2013 on Bosnian citizens, including all three main ethnic communities – 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. Our Bayesian regression models find those who 
suffer greater hardship during displacement are more likely to foresee political violence. 
In addition, we find hardship during displacement is a more powerful predictor, than the 
experience of violence either by oneself or by someone close to him/her (“victimization” 
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according to the terminology of the literature). While victimization does have an impact 
on the expectation of political violence as suggested by the literature, other hardships, 
such as the lack of support, also seem to matter. The robustness checks, including a 
sensitivity analysis (Harada 2013), indicate the findings are plausible even in light of 
unmeasured confounders, such as the inherently pessimistic nature of respondents. 
 The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the literature. This is followed 
by our theory and hypothesis. We then explain our data, the empirical strategy, and the 
results of the empirical analysis. Finally, we present our concluding remarks and sugget 
the implications of our findings for the broader literature and policymaking. 
 
Literature 
Although findings are mixed, the growing literature on the social and political effects of 
war on post-conflict attitudes offers a useful starting point for our study. As we go on to 
show, the literature has focused on the effects of victimization and displacement but has 
paid little attention to what actually happens to displaced people. This is where our paper 
makes a novel theoretical and empirical contribution. 
Bauer et al. (2016) provide an extensive review of the literature on the social and 
political effects of war on cooperative behavior in post-conflict society. Their meta-
analysis reveals exposure to war-related violence tends to increase cooperative behavior, 
but the effect seems to apply only to in-group members, whereby people will cooperate 
for their own group but not for others (see also Mironova and Whitt 2018). Mironova and 
Whitt (2016) suggest a similar point with respect to Bosnia, although they also note pro-
sociality towards an out-group has improved over time in relative terms. These studies 
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imply war experience does not necessarily lead people to be open to intergroup 
cooperation and, therefore, to reconciliation in a post-conflict society. 
On the other hand, Hartman and Morse (2018) find people previously exposed to 
war-related violence are more likely to host refugees who have fled war, and this 
relationship holds even for refugees of out-groups. The finding is based on a multiple set 
of data sources for Ivorian refugees in Liberia – a survey, conjoint experiments, and 
interviews. The implication is that war experiences can make people more cooperative 
with members of out-groups who are experiencing similar difficulties, thus increasing the 
chance of intergroup cooperation and reconciliation. 
Using survey data on the Darfur conflict, Hazlett (2017) finds people who have 
been exposed to violence are more likely than those who have not to believe it is possible 
to make peace with former enemies, with individuals from a former perpetrator group, 
and with the tribes from which the perpetrator group comes. These people also think less 
harsh punishment than execution is appropriate for government soldiers involved in the 
conflict. Summing up, Hazlett concludes exposure to war-related violence increases 
support for peace. Hazlett (2017, 8) attributes this to a war weariness that makes war 
victims “crave peace rather than vengeance,” an interesting rationalist explanation for the 
effect of war on attitudes. 
Some have more pessimistic findings on the relationship between victimization 
and support for peace. Looking at Bosnia, Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits (2017) report 
wartime exposure to ethnic violence makes people more likely to vote for their own ethnic 
parties in a post-war environment, thereby promoting ethnic politics. The implication is 
that previous ethnic violence hinders interethnic reconciliation in a post-conflict society. 
By the same token, Hirsch-Hoefler et al.’s (2016) empirical evidence from the Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict suggests exposure to political violence discourages victims from 
supporting peace with their opponents. In the case of Colombia, Tellez (2018) says those 
who have lived in conflict zones are more likely to support peace agreements but less 
likely to want to reintegrate with former enemies. The finding implies support for peace 
agreements reflects the fear of former enemies and future political violence rather than 
intergroup reconciliation. 
Hall et al. (2018) compare those who used to be displaced but then were able to 
return home with the still displaced in the case of Bosnia. They find restorative justice is 
preferred over retributive justice by the returnees, arguably because they are more likely 
to interact with former enemies in a post-conflict environment. While the study is novel 
in that it focuses on the variation in what happens to displaced people, the dichotomy 
between returnees and the still displaced is only one aspect of such variation. Our study 
examines the quality of displacement life in general. 
The literature has been accumulating empirical evidence (albeit often conflicting) 
for the effect of war-related experiences on attitudes to a post-conflict peace process in 
general and to the expectations of peace and violence in particular. Our study contributes 
to this growing literature by providing empirical evidence of the relationship between the 
degree of hardship during displacement, a byproduct of war, and the expectation of 
political violence in a post-conflict society. 
 
Theory 
In this article, we frame the anticipation of political violence in a post-conflict society as 
a rational expectation using information at hand (Gartner 2008). The literature on public 
support for war argues citizens rationally use available information about war and peace 
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to evaluate the ongoing situation (Eichenberg 2005; Gartner 2008; Reifler et al. 2014). 
One source of such information is past wartime experiences; these shape people’s 
(subjective) expectations (Bozzoli, Brück, and Muhumuza 2011). 
 We argue that, all else being equal, greater hardship during displacement means 
the displaced receive a greater amount of negative information about the conflict/peace 
process and their society. The negative information leads to a rational expectation of more 
negative experiences, making these persons more likely to expect a return of violence. 
Hardship during displacement is not limited to exposure to violence and abuse; it can 
include economic hardship (such as a low standard of living) and/or social hardship (such 
as isolation and loneliness) as well.2 
Hardship suffered during displacement can come from inter-group, intra-group, and 
international sources. First, members of an opposing group may project hostility and 
affect the displaced negatively. In the case of Bosnia, for example, authorities on all sides 
frequently expropriated homes of the expelled people in order to give them to “their own” 
(co-ethnic) refugees from elsewhere (Toal and Dahlman 2011). As this example suggests, 
even if the displaced are safely away from direct exposure to harrassment and violence, 
an opposing group can still cause hardship. 
Second, the displaced may not get enough support from members of their own 
group or even become subject to intra-group discrimination. For example, Singer (2000, 
32) points out that in post-conflict Sarajevo, “much of the holdup in permitting the return 
of refugees is due to intra-ethnic discrimination...The primarily Muslim ruling 
 
2 Our own survey data suggest that overall hardship during displacement largely stems from 
economic hardship rather than victimization. The correlation coefficient between overall hardship 
and economic hardship is 0.83, while that between overall hardship and victimization (including 
both a respondent’s and that of someone close to him/her) is 0.15. It should be noted that the 
survey data cannot identify whether victimization occured during displacement or before. 
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party...distributes apartments as political rewards to loyal members to the exclusion of 
disenfranchised Bosnian Muslim refugees.” 
 Third, external actors such as the UN, NGOs, and “Western” powers may fail to 
provide enough support for the displaced, leaving them living in miserable conditions. 
They may even become perpetrators, as some reports speak of peacekeepers abusing the 
locals (UN News Centre 2019). In the case of Bosnia, German authorities apparently 
pressured Bosnian refugees in Germany to go back to their home country; as these 
refugees were not necessarily allowed to return to their original homes, many were 
relegated to internal displacement (“Bosnian Refugees” 1999). 
 Regardless of its source or nature, hardship during displacement consitutes 
negative information about conflict actors. When hardship is inter-group in origin, the 
displaced have difficulty believing peace with the opposing group is viable (Beber, 
Roessler, and Scacco 2014). Meanwhile, intra-group hardship creates distrust of the 
members of the displaced person’s own group, and internationally sourced hardship 
causes pessimism about the viability of an international “humanitarian” solution. People 
naturally use their knowledge to gauge the future – in this case, to estimate the likelihood 
of political violence in the future. Negative information about an opposing group directly 
relates to the fear of future political violence caused by that group, while knowledge of 
hardship caused by members of one’s own group and international actors casts doubt on 
their ability to sustain peace. In short, greater hardship makes people more pessimistic 
about others’ general propensity to help and cooperate; such pessimism in turn translates 
into a sense that political violence is more probable.3 
 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this summarizing statement. 
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Based on the above argumentation, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Those who suffer greater hardship during displacement are more likely to expect 
political violence in post-conflict society. 
 
Data 
Our original survey data include a nationally representative sample of Bosnians collected 
in 2013.4 Data collection comprised four stages: (1) selecting municipalities using simple 
random sampling, (2) selecting a polling station proportional to its size within selected 
municipalities, (3) selecting households using random route technique selection from a 
given address, and (4) selecting individuals within the household to be interviewed using 
a Kish table. The response rate was 63.53%, and 1,007 persons were interviewed. Of 
those, 751 had experienced displacement because of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s 
(among those, some already returned to their place of origin, while others were still 
displaced). More details on the data collection are available in Stefanovic and Loizides 
(2017). 
 The Bosnian case is useful for displacement studies, not only because of the sheer 
numbers of displaced/returnees, but also because of the significant involvement of the 
international community in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Using 
individual-level data, our study can examine whether variations among (former) 
displaced persons in the expectation of political violence can be traced to different degrees 
 
4 The data collection was done by Sarajevo-based IPSOS BH, with funding provided by the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as a part of the project “The Way Home: 
Peaceful Voluntary Return” (SMU Research Ethics Board Certification: # 12 – 224). 
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of hardship during displacement. If the Bosnian case indicates hardship during 
displacement influences people’s attitudes to the sustainability of peace in a post-conflict 
society, this implies even the heavy involvement of the international community may not 
be enough to shape positive public opinions of post-conflict peace in other cases either. 
 The dataset contains a variable indicating whether respondents were displaced 
because of the 1992-1995 war. Since our focus is on displaced people’s hardship, we use 
a subset of the data including only respondents who experienced displacement because 
of the war. It would be inappropriate if we included those who were not displaced in our 
dataset and used the product term between the binary variable of the displaced vs. the 
non-displaced and the degree of hardship during displacement. First, we are interested in 
the effect of different degrees of hardship during displacement, in particular, the effect on 
the expectation of political violence, rather than the effect of displacement in general. 
Second, it is not possible to code a score for the degree of hardship during displacement 
for people who were not displaced.5 It might be possible to compare hardship experienced 
by the displaced with the one experienced by the non-displaced, if we assumed the two 
types of hardship are comparable (which might or might not be the case) and had an 
equivalent measure of hardship for the non-displaced. Unfortunately, our data do not have 
such a measure.  
 In our empirical models, we do not control for whether those who experienced 
displacement were still in displacement at the time of the survey or already returned to 
 
5 If we do a simple cross-tab chi-square test, we find only a slight difference between (former) 
displaced and non-displaced people in the expectation of political violence: 25.3% (former) 
displaced people vs. 26.7% non-displaced people with the p-value of .69 when we include 
terrorism in the definition of political violence; 21.7% vs. 17.6% with the p-value of .21 when we 
exclude terrorism in the definition of political violence. This result implies the (former) displaced 
are on average not necessarily less optimistic than the non-displaced. 
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their place of origin, for the following reason. Hardship during displacement is likely to 
affect the likelihood of people returning. Therefore, whether a respondent has returned or 
remains in displacement is a post-treatment variable; if controlled for, it could prevent us 
from computing the total effect of hardship during displacement as a mediator or 
introduce a post-treatment bias as a collider (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018; Pearl 
and Mackenzie 2018). 
Note that while the original dataset contains weighting scores, allowing us to infer 
population parameters from the sample, we do not use them, because there is no guarantee 
that the subset of (former) displaced persons from a nationally representative sample is 
actually representative of the entire population of (former) displaced persons. It is 
unlikely that the distribution of all relevant variables (including unobservable ones) is the 
same for the population of (former) displaced persons and for that of Bosnians in general; 
for example, it is plausible to suspect a certain type of person is more likely to be displaced 
(e.g., someone unwilling to join armed groups). For this reason, we seek internal rather 
than external validity. Our analysis is simply a first step probing the implications of 
hardship during displacement for post-conflict society and peacebuilding. We hope other 
research will accumulate additional knowledge, making our findings more generalizable. 
 
Dependent Variables 
We measure respondents’ expectation of political violence, using questions about how 
likely armed conflict, terrorist attacks, civil war, guerrilla warfare, and war with 
neighboring countries are to occur within ten years; the respondents were asked to choose 
one of “very unlikely,” “somewhat unlikely,” “somewhat likely,” and “very likely.” The 
expectation of political violence is coded 1 if a respondent answers “very likely” or 
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“somewhat likely” to at least one of the above categories of political violence; it is coded 
0 if the answer is “very unlikely” or “somewhat unlikely.”6 For a robustness check, we 
exclude terrorist attacks; respondents might mean terrorist attacks irrelevant to the ethnic 
conflict in/around Bosnia, such as terrorism of foreign origin, thus introducing some 
heterogeneity into the measurement. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Hardship during displacement is measured by the question “How would you describe 
your overall situation while in displacement?” Answers are on a 5-point scale: 1 
“extremely hard,” 2 “hard,” 3 “tolerable,” 4 “good,” and 5 “very good.” For ease of 
interpretation, we reverse the numbering; that is, the higher the value, the harder the 
situation has been during displacement. Although our data include information on various 
aspects of displacement (e.g., whether respondents were internally or internationally 
displaced),7 we rely on self-assessments of overall hardship. This is necessary to test our 
hypothesis; what matters in our theory is how respondents subjectively feel about their 
overall displacement experience, whether domestic or international. Displacement could 
meet different objectives for ethnic groups and individuals. While Bosnian Muslims 
advocate the right of return, for the most part Bosnian Serbs (and Croats) prefer their 
consolidation of control in their new territories. For at least some members of the latter 
 
6 An alternative way to code this information is to assign an order of integers to respondents’ 
assessment of the likelihood of each category of political violence – 1 to “very unlikely,” 2 to 
“somewhat unlikely,” 3 to “somewhat likely,” and 4 to “very likely” – and calculate the mean 
across all categories of political violence. This results in a variable whose distribution is bounded 
between 1 and 4 and turns out to be skewed because many answers are 1. We use Bayesian 
Gamma regression with the log link function; the effect of hardship during displacement is 
retained (see Supplementary File). Posterior predictive checks indicate the models occasionally 
predict values beyond the bounds but overall fit the data. 
7 Note that international borders shifted during the Yugoslav wars. 
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group, forced displacement might have the (unintentional) positive effect of living with 
co-ethnics in a territory of their own, often with better housing. Again, our data do not 
have an equivalent measure of hardship experienced by the non-displaced respondents 
and, therefore, we do not use the interaction between hardship and the experience of 
displacement. 
In Supplementary File, we empirically explore whether international or internal 
displacement amplifies the effect of hardship during displacement. To summarize the 
results, international displacement amplifies the effect of hardship during displacement. 
When a respondent reports greater hardship, international displacement increases the 
probability of the respondent expecting political violence; when a respondent reports 
lower hardship, international displacement decreases the probability. We speculate great 
hardship during international displacement implies an unwelcome environment in the 
host country, while low hardship during international displacement suggests a successful 
integration to the host country. In short, there may be greater variation in the quality of 
life when people were internationally displaced than when internally displaced. 
 We control for the history of the victimization of respondents and the 
victimization of someone close to them. Respondents were asked the following question: 
“Did you personally experience any of the following during the conflict?” The binary 
variable is coded 1 if the respondents answer “yes” to any of “verbal abuse,” “physical 
injury,” “imprisonment,” and “torture” and 0 otherwise. The victimization of someone 
close is also a binary variable, coded 1 if respondents answer “yes” to the question “Did 
anyone close to you lose his/her life during the conflict?”; and coded 0 if the answer is 
“no.” The literature disagrees on “which kinds of war experiences are the most powerful 
ones on individual attitude and behavior” (Freitag, Kijewski, and Oppold 2017, 5), and 
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the history of victimization in general during the conflict may be a more important factor 
shaping expectations of political violence than hardship in displacement. Those with a 
history of victimhood – direct or indirect – may suffer psychologically during 
displacement, thereby reporting greater hardship during displacement and being more 
likely to foresee political violence in the future. The possibility of the history of 
victimization being a confounder is slim based on an initial look at the data: the 
correlation between each of the victimization variables and hardship during displacement 
is low (.09 and .13 respectively). Nevertheless, we control for those variables to fully 
examine the possibility of confounding. 
We also control for four demographic variables: the pre-war economic situation 
of a respondent’s family (an ordinal scale of 1 “extremely poor” to 5 “very good”), age,8 
biological sex (0=male, 1=female), and the municipality of residence before the war. 
These are by definition pre-treatment (pre-war) variables (except for age, i.e., if a 
respondent was born after the outbreak of the war); thus, they do not introduce post-
treatment bias or mediate the total effect of hardship during displacement. If respondents 
were born in or after 1992, they are omitted from the models; hardship during 
displacement might have delayed their parents’ decision to have a child and, therefore, 
the age of people born during and after the war could be a post-treatment variable. Even 
if we include those respondents, the results are substantively the same (see Supplementary 
File). The pre-war municipalities of residence are used as dummy variables to control for 
cross-sectional heterogeneity.  
 
8 We also check whether age has a U-shape effect on the expectation of political violence, by 
including the squared value of age. We find age squared has a relatively low credibility of having 
an effect. See Supplementary File. 
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Table 1 displays the summary statistics for all variables. In the regression analysis, 
we divide age by ten to make the odds ratio more intuitive to interpret (i.e., one unit 
increase corresponds to ten years older rather than one year older). Table 2 presents cross-
tabs between the degree of hardship during displacement and each of the two dependent 
variables measuring the expectation of political violence; the table suggests a positive 
relationship between a greater degree of hardship and a higher probability of a respondent 
expecting political violence.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Expectation of pol. violence (inc. terrorism) 577 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Expectation of pol. violence (exc. terrorism) 581 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Hardship during displacement 743 3.71 1.01 1 5 
History of victimization (respondent) 735 0.16 0.36 0 1 
History of victimization (someone close) 737 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Pre-war economic situation 744 4.01 0.88 1 5 
Age 751 53 17 18 91 
Female 751 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Pre-war municipality of residence 739 44.18 26.77 1 93 
 
We do not control for factors such as education, income, ethnocentrism, ethnic 
identity, and the municipality of residence after the war. All these factors are likely to be 
affected by hardship during displacement, making them post-treatment variables. 
Hardship during displacement is likely to affect education and work opportunities. It may 
also create resentment of ethnic groups who were on the opposing side in the war. Even 
ethnic identity is often a product of ethnic violence; while many Bosnian people used to 
identify themselves as “Yugoslav” or “Bosnian,” the war hardened the division of ethnic 
groups, increasing the salience of ethnic identity. Finally, hardship during displacement 
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may well have led respondents to seek to live in a particular municipality (e.g., where co-
ethnics are dominant) to avoid further hardship. 
 
Table 2: Cross-tabs between hardship during displacement and the expectation of political 
violence 




(inc. terrorism)   
Expectation of 
political violence 
(exc. terrorism)   
0 (no) 1 (yes) Total 0 (no) 1 (yes) Total 
1 (very good) 13 1 14 14 0 14 
 92.86% 7.14% 100% 100% 0% 100% 
2 (good) 53 9 62 55 7 62 
 85.48% 14.52% 100% 88.71% 11.29% 100% 
3 (tolerable) 101 47 148 111 39 150 
 68.24% 31.76% 100% 74% 26% 100% 
4 (hard) 158 52 210 164 47 211 
 75.24% 24.76% 100% 77.73% 22.27% 100% 
5 (extremely hard) 103 37 140 108 33 141 
  73.57% 26.43% 100% 76.60% 23.40% 100% 
Total 428 146 574 452 126 578 
  74.56% 25.44% 100% 78.20% 21.80% 100% 
 
Estimator 
Our Bayesian regression models look more closely at the relationship by including the 
control variables and estimating uncertainty. We use Bayesian logit regression, as the 
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dependent variables are dichotomously coded.9 The R package “rstanarm” is used for data 
analysis (Stan Development Team 2016).10 
 Bayesian estimation has two major advantages for our analysis. First, our survey 
data include respondents from many municipalities, but a few municipalities have only a 
small number of respondents. In such a context, the classical logit regression model drops 
municipalities with no variation in the dependent variable. In Bayesian estimation, 
parameters for those municipalities can be stably estimated, given priors that regularize 
estimation (we discuss the choice of priors later). 
 Second, Bayesian models provide more intuitive interpretation of the uncertainty 
of estimated effects than traditional Frequentist models; a posterior distribution can tell 
us the probability of an effect exceeding a specific effect size given data. To avoid 
confusing the probability of an effect (i.e., the uncertainty of an estimate) with the 
probability of an event (i.e., the chance of an event – the expectation of political violence 
in our case – being observed), we use the term “credibility” to mean the former. 
 We calculate the credibility of an effect whose size, if the estimated mean odds 
ratio is greater than one, exceeds at least an odds ratio of 1.05 (i.e., the effect increasing 
the odds of a respondent expecting political violence at least by 5%). If the estimated 
mean odds ratio is smaller than one, we use an odds ratio of .95 (i.e., the effect decreasing 
 
9 As an additional test, we ran a Mahalonobis matching with a caliper of one using the psmatch2 
package in Stata (Leuven and Sianesi 2003). As the package accepts only a binary treatment, we 
recoded the variable dichotomously as “very good” and “good” to 0 and “tolerable,” “hard,” and 
“extremely hard” to 1 (“tolerable” still has a sense of negativity and, therefore, its meaning is 
closer to life being “hard” than “good”). The results are consistent with our main ones: the average 
treatment effect for the treated (ATT) is .47 and its standard error is .12 for the dependent variable 
whose definition includes terrorism; the ATT is .41 and its standard error is .12 for the dependent 
variable whose definition exclude terrorism. 
10 In the Markov chain Monte Carlo process, we use four chains, each of which has 10,000 
iterations; the first 2,000 iterations are discarded. 
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the odds of a respondent expecting political violence at least by 5%).11 The unconditional 
mean probability of a respondent expecting political violence (if terrorism is included in 
the definition) is .26; a 5% increase in the odds raises the probability to .27, while a 5% 
decrease lowers it to .25. Thus, in our case, a 5% change in the odds ratio is likely to 
result in a meaningful change in the probability of a respondent expecting political 
violence.12 
 For priors, we use the default weakly informative prior in the rstanarm package 
(Gabry and Goodrich 2019). 13  We use the weakly informative prior rather than a 
completely noninformative prior (such as a flat prior) for regularization and stable 
estimation. The prior is a plausible choice for three reasons. First, it makes empirical 
testing harder for our hypothesis than assigning a prior with a positive mean with a small 
standard deviation, even though our theory suggests the latter type of prior. Second, as 
the literature is divided on the effect of victimization on the expectation of political 
violence, our prior belief is indecisive about the direction of the effect. Third, we do not 
have a strong prior belief in the direction of the effect of the demographic variables.  
 
11 The odds are the probability of a dependent variable = 1 divided by the probability of a 
dependent variable = 0. An odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of a regressor taking some value, to 
the odds of the regressor taking the value increased by one unit. An odds ratio greater than one 
indicates a positive effect; an odds ratio smaller than one indicates a negative effect. The 
coefficients of logit regression models are the natural logarithm of odds ratios. Thus, if we 
exponentiate them, we get odds ratios. 
12 The relationship between the probability and the odds is monotonic but not linear; thus, exactly 
how much a 5% change in the odds changes the probability depends on the values of the covariates. 
For ease of interpretation, we later discuss the predicted probability of the expectation of political 
violence given a varying degree of hardship during displacement. 
13 The default prior is a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 2.5 for 
the slopes and a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 10 for the 
intercept. When a model is run via the package, the standard deviations of the priors are 
automatically adjusted to account for the different scales of the variables; and the mean of zero 
for the prior of the intercept makes sense as the rstanarm package automatically centers all 
predictors during the estimation process (the final outputs are in the original scales of the 
predictors) (Gabry and Goodrich 2019). 




The results of the Bayesian logit regressions are displayed in Table 3. The first two 
models examine the dependent variable including terrorism in the definition, and the 
remaining two models examine the dependent variable excluding terrorism. In each case, 
there is a model without any controls and a model with controls (the municipality 
dummies are included in both cases). For each variable, the mean odds ratios are reported 
in the upper row; the credibility of an odds ratio > 1.05 (if the mean odds ratio > 1) or < 
.95 (if the mean odds ratio < 1) is inside parentheses in the lower row. ?̂? ≈ 1 for all 
parameters in every model, suggesting the Markov chain Monte Carlo process did not fail 
to converge. The posterior predictive checks indicate the models fit the data well (see 
Supplementary File for the graphs). 
 
Table 3: Bayesian logit regression of the expectation of political violence 
 (including terrorism) (excluding terrorism) 
 Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model 1-3 Model 1-4 
Hardship during displacement 1.29 1.36 1.40 1.39 
 (0.96) (0.98) (0.99) (0.98) 
History of victimization  0.93  1.21 
 (respondent)  (0.53)  (0.67) 
History of victimization  1.55  1.30 
 (someone close)  (0.93)  (0.79) 
Pre-war economic situation  1.02  1.02 
 of respondent’s family  (0.41)  (0.43) 
Age  0.81  0.87 
  (0.98)  (0.86) 
Female  0.96  0.79 
  (0.49)  (0.77) 
Constant 0.12 0.24 0.07 0.13 
 (1.00) (0.92) (1.00) (0.98) 
Municipality dummies yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 559 543 563 547 
Credibility of an odds ratio > 1.05 (if the mean odds ratio > 1) or < .95 (if the mean odds ratio is 
< 1) in parentheses; ?̂? ≈ 1 for all parameters 
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 In all models, hardship during displacement is positively associated with the 
expectation of political violence; with a credibility of .96 to .99 (depending on the 
models), the effect of the variable going up by one unit (e.g., from 4=“hard” to 
5=“extremely hard”) produces at least a 5% increase in the odds of a respondent expecting 
political violence. 
 To make interpretation more intuitive, in Table 4, we present the predicted 
probability of a respondent expecting political violence.14 This is calculated based on 
Model 1-2, varying the value of hardship during displacement and holding all other 
covariates at the mean or mode.15 Given our threshold of the minimum effect size as an 
odds ratio of 1.05, the change from “very good” to “extremely hard” produces a difference 
of at least .019 in the predicted probability, with a credibility of .98. Substantively 
speaking, if two groups of displaced people were the same except that one felt life during 
displacement was “very good” while the other felt it was “extremely hard,” we would 
expect, with a credibility of .98, that the probability of the latter expecting political 
violence would be at least .019 higher than that of the former.16 We emphasize “at least” 
because the difference is calculated based on the minimum credible value in the posterior 
distribution of the odds ratio, given a credibility of .98. The focus on the minimum 
credible value is useful, because it tells us what the least bad case could be (“bad” in the 
sense that a respondent is likely to expect political violence). 
 
14  The predicted probability can be calculated using a logistic function: P(𝑌 = 1) = 1/(1 +
exp(−(𝑋𝛽)) ), where 𝑌 is the dependent variable, 𝑋 is the matrix of the explanatory variables, 
and 𝛽 is a vector of log odds ratio coefficients. Since the posteriors of parameter values are jointly 
distributed, we fix the odds ratios of the control variables at those conditional on the odds ratio of 
hardship during displacement being 1.05. 
15 As for the municipality dummies, we choose the one whose posterior mean is closest to the 
mean of the posterior means of all municipality dummies. 
16 This causal interpretation is conditional on the model and identification strategy being plausible. 
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Table 4: Predicted probabilities of the expectation of political violence 
Degree of hardship 
during displacement 
Probability by the 
minimum credible value 
Probability by 
the mean value 
95% credible interval 
around the mean 
1 (very good) .104 .179 [.010 .586] 
2 (good) .108 .217 [.015 .643] 
3 (tolerable) .113 .262 [.020 .703] 
4 (hard) .118 .312 [.027 .763] 
5 (extremely hard) .123 .367 [.036 .817] 
 
 Following conventional practice, we also present the predicted probability 
estimated by the means of the posterior distributions and its 95% credible interval. The 
results imply that if we counterfactually assigned those who felt life during displacement 
was “very good” to the response category “extremely hard,” we would expect the 
probability of these people expecting political violence will increase, on average, by .188 
(.367 minus .179) in absolute terms.17 Note that the credible interval of this difference 
cannot be computed as the difference of the credible interval of each category: in other 
words, it is not .026 (.036 minus .010) and .231 (.817 minus .586). We need to compute 
the credible interval over the posterior distribution of the difference in the predicted 
probability, as displayed in Table 5. The credible interval for the difference between 
“extremely hard” and “very good” includes .012 and .432, meaning that the difference in 




17 Again, this causal interpretation is conditional on the model and identification strategy being 
plausible. 
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Table 5: 95% credible interval of the difference in the predicted probabilities between 
two different degrees of hardship during displacement 
 vs. “very good” vs. “good” vs. “tolerable” vs. “hard” 
“good” [.002 .099] - - - - - - 
“tolerable” [.005 .209] [.003 .110] - - - - 
“hard” [.008 .320] [.006 .226] [.003 .118] - - 
“extremely hard” [.012 .432] [.010 .342] [.007 .238] [.004 .123] 
 
 Finally, we review the results of the control variables. 18  The history of the 
victimization of a respondent is negatively associated with the expectation of political 
violence in Model 1-2 but positively associated in Model 1-4. In Model 1-2, the credibility 
of the effect producing at least a 5% decrease in the odds is .53; in Model 1-4, the 
credibility of the effect producing at least a 5% increase in the odds is .67. 
The history of the victimization of someone close to the respondent has a more 
consistent effect, albeit with some degree of uncertainty. While the coefficient is 
positively associated with the expectation of political violence in both Model 1-2 and 
Model 1-4, the credibility of the effect producing at least a 5% change in the odds is .93 
in Model 1-2 and .79 in Model 1-4. 
 The pre-war economic situation of the respondent’s family has a negligible effect. 
Both the mean odds ratio and the credibility of the effect are small. Age is negatively 
associated with the expectation of political violence, with the credibility of the effect 
producing at least a 5% decrease in the odds being high (.98 in Model 1-2 and .86 in 
Model 1-4). Female respondents are negatively associated with the expectation of 
 
18 The coefficients of the controls are unlikely to represent the total effects, given some of the 
controls may causally precede others and given we assume all these controls causally precede 
hardship during displacement (Keele, Stevenson, and Elwert 2019; Pearl and Mackenzie 2018). 
We speculate the pre-war economic situation of a respondent’s family, his/her age, and his/her 
gender causally, and fairly independently from one another, precede the history of victimization 
(either of the respondent or of someone close). 
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political violence; we find at least a 5% decrease in the odds, with the credibility either 
very low (.49 in Model 1-2) or modest (.77 in Model 1-4). 
 
Endogeneity Concern 
It is common to measure the history of victimization during conflict using respondents’ 
self-reports of violence (Hartman and Morse 2018; Hazlett 2017; Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 
2016), but Child and Nikolova (2018) raise a methodological concern about the use of 
self-reported measures of victimization in the study of war experiences and social 
attitudes. The more pessimistic people are, they argue, the more likely they are to 
remember the negative experiences. This implies that the relationship between hardship 
during displacement and the expectation of political violence could be endogenous. 
We address this endogeneity concern empirically. To this end, we first develop a 
causal diagram (Pearl and Mackenzie 2018) to clarify exactly what pessimism could do 
as a confounder. As in Figure 1, if respondents were inherently pessimistic, we should 
expect they are more likely to leave their homes for fear of war (i.e., more likely to be 
displaced and experience hardship), more likely to remember hardship during 
displacement, and more likely to expect political violence. In other words, pessimism 
should have a positive biasing effect on all three, as indicated by the “+” signs on the 
arrows in Figure 1. Without controlling for pessimism, we cannot directly identify the 
effect of hardship during displacement on the expectation of political violence. The 
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Figure 1: Causal diagram 
 
 
First, because we have data on both those who experienced displacement and 
those who did not, we can estimate the difference in the expectation of political violence 
between these two groups. Given Figure 1, we should find those who experienced 
displacement are more likely to expect political violence than those who did not. To 
investigate this, we examine the sample including both types of respondents and use the 
experience of being displaced as a binary predictor (1=yes, 0=no). We find no clear 
evidence for the difference if we use the dependent variable including terrorism in its 
definition; if we use the dependent variable excluding terrorism in its definition, there is 
a .79–.84 credibility that the displaced are more likely to expect political violence than 
the non-displaced (see Table A7 in Supplementary File). The former results should be 
prioritized over the latter results, however, given that inherently pessimistic people should 
expect not only political violence relevant to the ethnic conflict but also terrorism in 
general. This result implies, given Figure 1, that pessimism does not have such a large 
effect to create the strong correlation our models find between hardship during 
displacement and the expectation of political violence. 
Second, we run a sensitivity analysis (Harada 2013) to compute how large the 
effect of pessimism must be to nullify the association between hardship during 
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displacement and the expectation of political violence. Sensitivity analysis introduces a 
hypothetical confounder into a model and calculates the effect size of the confounder 
necessary to reduce the size of a treatment effect to a specific amount. We set the amount 
as the minimum effect size of our interest, an odds ratio of 1.05. Since the level of the 
pessimistic nature of respondents is a potential unobservable confounder, we assume the 
confounder is a continuous variable. We base the sensitivity analysis on Model 1-2. We 
use a linear probability model for stable estimation. 
As reported in Figure 2, the effect size of the confounder (expressed as a 
curvilinear line) has to be much larger than any of the control variables (expressed as + 
symbols) to reduce the mean effect size of hardship during displacement to the minimum 
effect size of interest. All the control variables are positioned much lower than the curve. 
Any municipality-level confounders are already controlled for by the municipality 
dummies, so potential unobservables should be at the individual level.19 As our previous 
discussion suggests, the most obvious individual-level confounder is the pessimistic 
nature of respondents. The sensitivity analysis suggests another reason why this 
confounder may not have a large enough effect to nullify the effect of hardship during 






19 The municipality dummies are not shown in Figure 2, because their effects controlling for the 
unobservables at the municipality level cannot be compared with the effects of any remaining 
individual-level unobservables. 
Displacement and the Expectation of Political Violence 
27 
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis 
 
 
In Figure 2, even relatively powerful covariates are positioned much lower than 
the curve. In Model 1-2, the history of victimization of someone close has a mean odds 
ratio of 1.55, with a credibility of .93 that the effect size is at least greater than an odds 
ratio of 1.05; the variable of age has a mean odds ratio of 0.81, with a credibility of .98 
that the effect size is at least smaller than an odds ratio of .95. The unobserved confounder 
must have a much greater effect than these covariates to nullify the effect of hardship 
during displacement. 
If the unobserved confounder were that powerful, we should see a significant 
correlation between another variable that is affected by the pessimistic nature of 
respondents and the expectation of political violence. Yet Table 3 tells us that the history 
of victimization (of respondents) is little correlated with the expectation of political 
violence, contrary to what Child and Nikolova (2018) argue. In addition, we can check 
whether respondents answered another question on hardship – their health conditions one 
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year after displacement – in a way that produces a significant correlation with the 
expectation of political violence. We find that a self-reported poorer health condition is 
barely correlated with the expectation of political violence: the correlation coefficient is 
0.021, with a p-value of 0.623 for the dependent variable of Models 1-1 and 1-2; the 
correlation coefficient is 0.05, with a p-value of 0.234 for the dependent variable of 
Models 1-3 and 1-4. These empirics suggest, again, that pessimism does not have such a 
large effect to create the strong correlation our models find between hardship during 
displacement and the expectation of political violence. 
Given these analyses, it may be reasonable to speculate that the association 
between hardship during displacement and the expectation of political violence is more 
than just the result of the endogeneity. Of course, as in the case of most observational 
studies, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility of endogeneity. Still, these analyses 
ameliorate concerns about the association between the degree of hardship during 
displacement and the expectation of political violence being not causal.20 
 
Conclusion 
Our findings demonstrate the importance of the effect of hardships experienced in 
displacement on the expectation of political violence in a post-conflict society. We 
 
20 We run another sensitivity analysis, the psacalc command in Stata (Oster 2019). We follow 
Oster’s (2019, 203) recommendations for observational data as follows. We compute δ, the ratio 
of the effect of the unobserved confounders to that of the observed confounders, provided (1) that 
𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥
2 = 1.3𝑅2, where 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥
2  is the maximum R-squared given both observed and unobserved 
confounders, and (2) 𝛽 = 0 , where 𝛽  is the treatment effect. We find 𝛿 ≈ −6.28  for the 
dependent variable whose definition includes terrorism, and 𝛿 ≈ −10.01  for the dependent 
variable whose definition excludes terrorism. This means the unobserved confounders must be at 
least 6.28 as powerful as the observed confounders, and the former must bias the treatment effect 
in an opposite direction to the latter. As discussed already, it is unlikely that the effect of the 
pessimistic nature of respondents, the most obvious unobserved confounder, is that large. 
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initially hypothesized that those who suffer more during displacement are more likely to 
expect political violence. Our Bayesian models suggest the empirical validity of our 
hypothesis in the Bosnian case. 
The article has several policy and scholarly implications. First and foremost, 
improving people’s lives during displacement is critical, as their personal expectations of 
peace and violence can directly affect post-conflict conditions, both their own and those 
of the larger society. At the individual level, it is stressful to fear political violence, and 
alternative options might not be attractive: moving elsewhere, assimilating to a dominant 
culture (if allowed to do so by the dominant group), or resorting to self-defense measures. 
At the societal level, the fear of political violence might give hardliners opportunities to 
mobilize along ethnic lines, turning fear into a self-fulfilling prophecy and increasing the 
likelihood of peace agreements breaking down (Kaufman 2001; Petersen 2002).  
According to our analysis, hardship during displacement is a major factor in 
shaping the expectations of political violence in Bosnia. Despite the significant 
involvement of the international community in post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacebuilding, some displaced persons have not been assisted enough. This is important, 
particularly because those suffering hardship during displacement might not see external 
actors involved in the peace process as legitimate, rendering the viability of any 
externally-mediated peace agreement doubtful. 
The article also highlights the importance of “giving a voice” to war victims 
themselves. Despite a long tradition of “positive peace” studies (Galtung 1969), the 
scholarship remains limited. Making use of micro-level data, this article contributes to 
the literature both theoretically and empirically. While displacement itself is a tragic 
consequence of war, if the degree of hardship during displacement has an effect on a post-
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conflict public opinion, as our analysis suggests, it should be considered in peace plans, 
and those experiencing the hardship should be consulted.  
While our empirical models are limited to the Bosnian case, our findings could be 
relevant to other similar cases. For example, the Syrian war has caused a huge number of 
refugees and IDPs, but their lives during displacement have varied significantly. Our 
findings suggest that to ensure a rigorous post-conflict reconstruction once the war 
eventually ends, it is important to help these displaced people have life that meets 
humanitarian standards now. 
One avenue for future research would be to examine how the expectation of 
political violence affects the propensity to support peace. Some of those who expect 
political violence might support peace; others might support preventive violence. Both 
can be a function of the expectation of political violence, conditioned by some third 
factor. This is an important topic to understand how likely the fear of future political 
violence is to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Future studies could also include additional measures of displacement 
experiences. For example, the passage of time since displacement (e.g., using longitudinal 
surveys) might create interesting variations in the expectation of political violence. In 
addition, some people who experience horrible levels of hardship during displacement 
might actually recover very well, while others who experience a lower level of hardship 
might continue to have serious problems. It is equally important to probe a possible 
correlation between the subjective sense of difficulty during displacement and the 
objective measures of displacement, such as the types of support received. Looking at 
such a correlation could help policymakers develop appropriate policies to address the 
needs of displaced people. 
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Finally, while our empirical analysis is limited to the Bosnian case, it would be 
important to extend the geographic scope. For example, the Life in Transition Survey 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2019) includes cross-country data 
on war-related experiences and political/social attitudes. Unfortunately, the data do not 
contain information about different experiences during displacement. Future large-scale 
surveys could include specific questions on different experiences during and post-
displacement benefiting comparative research and broader generalizations.  
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